Lingering concerns about child custody and support by Baker, Maureen
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Introduction
Since the 1970s, separation and divorce rates have 
increased in most Western countries, reflecting broad 
societal changes such as growing secularisation and 
individualism, changing labour markets and migration 
patterns, new ideas about entitlements and obligations, 
and widespread legal reforms. Despite these changes, 
most people agree that children in the ‘post-divorce 
family’ deserve adequate living standards and the 
continued love and support of both parents (Beck-
Gernsheim, 2002). In addition, supporting one’s 
children is required by national laws and international 
agreements such as the United Nations’ Convention on 
the Rights of the Child (Baker, 2006).
Over the past three decades, New Zealand as well 
as Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and the 
United States (‘liberal welfare states’1) have reformed 
their social policies relating to custody and support to 
reflect evolving ideas about children’s rights, gender 
equity, and the state’s role in family life. This article 
discusses some of the policy implications of relationship 
breakdown at a time when fewer couples legally marry, 
separation rates are high, more mothers are employed, 
international travel has increased and the enforcement 
of certain family obligations has been tightened.
New Zealand policies are discussed together with those 
of Canada and Australia because these countries share a 
common legal and policy heritage as British colonies,2 
they have been categorised as liberal welfare states and 
have traded policy solutions in the past. In addition, 
their net migration rates are particularly high and an 
increasing number of residents have dual citizenship 
(OECD, 2007, p.47). As more people migrate for 
education, work and family reasons, intermarriage and 
childbearing become prevalent between partners from 
different jurisdictions. If relationships dissolve after 
children are born, resident or custodial parents3 may 
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cross international borders to return home but they 
sometimes do so unlawfully, without the consent of 
the other parent. Parents also cross borders to avoid 
support obligations, to flee from abusive partners or to 
gain child custody. Increasingly, governments are signing 
international agreements to help deal with parents who 
cross borders without fulfilling their spousal or parental 
obligations. However, the vast majority of couples 
resolve custody and support issues without assistance 
from the courts.
Despite the development of social programmes 
for caring, such as the Domestic Purposes Benefit, 
children living in sole-parent households continue to 
experience higher poverty rates4 than those in two-
parent households (OECD, 2005, p.57). Policy concern 
about sole-parent households has also reflected a number 
of other children’s issues that sometimes correlate 
with low income, including adjustment problems, 
reduced paternal contact, and lack of cooperative and 
authoritative parenting (Pryor and Rodgers, 2001). The 
public cost of caring allowances has also increased with 
more marriage breakdown, cohabitation and births 
outside marriage.
This article focuses more on mother-led households 
than father-led households because most children live 
with their mothers after separation, fewer mothers 
than fathers are employed, more mothers have relied 
on costly caring allowances, and mothers remain sole 
parents longer than fathers (Baker & Tippin, 1999). 
1  ‘Liberal welfare regimes’ refer to systems of social provision that rely 
mainly on individual earnings while providing relatively ungenerous 
public support to needy households.
2 Except the French Canadian province of Quebec.
3 Separated parents who normally live with and care for their children 
most of the time.
4 Defined as less than 50% of median household income adjusted 
for family size.
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The percentage of sole mothers receiving caring benefits 
has varied over the years but has always been higher 
in Australia and New Zealand than in Canada. For 
example, 94% of sole mothers in Australia and 89% 
in New Zealand received caring allowances in the mid-
1990s, compared to about 44% in Canada (Baker & 
Tippin, 1999, p.34). Now, more sole mothers rely on 
their earnings, although those in Australia are permitted 
to receive the benefit for longer than in New Zealand 
and much longer than in Canada (Baker, 2006).5
Reducing the public cost of income support has been 
a major factor in recent social policy reform (Baker 
& Tippin, 1999; Boyd, 2003). Policy makers have 
struggled to alleviate poverty in sole-parent households 
and reduce the negative consequences of separation 
for children. However, they have tended to focus 
on collecting money from non-resident parents and 
curbing the cost of income support. At the same time, 
policy reforms have had to deal with the complex lives 
of post-separation parents (Callister & Birks, 2006), 
with mothers and fathers sometimes making conflicting 
demands for state intervention.
This article discusses several policy concerns relating to 
the post-divorce family in New Zealand, Canada and 
Australia, in order to highlight the complexity and show 
that these countries, which have shared policy options 
in the past, can continue to learn from cross-national 
comparisons.
Family reforms in the 1980s
With rising separation/divorce rates and more sole-
parent households living on income support, policy 
makers were pressed to make controversial reforms 
throughout the 1980s. In all three countries, divorce 
is now viewed as a ‘clean break’ which terminates 
rights and responsibilities to marriage partners but not 
obligations to children. The laws now permit one partner 
to seek a divorce without the other’s consent, meaning 
that wives can no longer delay court proceedings to 
negotiate a better financial settlement, as some did in the 
past, and spousal support is seldom paid. Furthermore, 
all three countries assume that separating parents can 
decide child custody and access for themselves and the 
courts intervene only when requested (Baker, 2006). By 
the 1970s, these countries had rejected the implication 
that children could be parental ‘property’ and began 
basing decisions about guardianship and residence on 
the ‘best interests of the child’. However, even judges 
disagree about what is best and children often prefer 
to live with both parents even when it is no longer 
feasible. Nevertheless, in all three countries, separating 
parents appearing before the courts are required to make 
parenting plans with the assistance of counselling and 
mediation services (ibid).
Although joint custody/guardianship6 has become more 
prevalent since the 1980s, it refers to legal responsibility 
rather than shared day-to-day care. Consequently, about 
three-quarters of children involved in divorce cases 
continue to live mostly with their mothers, but rates are 
higher for children of separated, never-married parents. 
Fathers typically become the non-resident parent but 
retain access or opportunities to visit or have the child 
stay overnight for a portion of the week, month or year 
(Baker, 2006). Both parents usually agree with this 
arrangement, the courts legalise it and parents rarely 
contest the decisions in court. Many fathers feel they 
cannot handle daily childcare while working full time, 
or believe that their children are better off with their 
mother. A small percentage of fathers say they want 
custody but think the courts will not give it to them, 
and a few protest over the courts’ alleged discrimination 
against fathers. By the 1990s, all three countries expected 
fathers to support their children regardless of their 
marital status or living arrangements (Funder, 1996; 
Shirley et al., 1997; Baker, 2006). New technology 
better enables the establishment of paternity and some 
jurisdictions spend considerable resources trying to 
identify fathers and enforce support.
After divorce, most non-resident fathers visit and 
support their children emotionally and financially, 
but only one third are highly involved in their care 
and upbringing. Another third are disengaged but 
maintain some contact, while the final third have little 
or no contact (Amato, 2004; Smyth, 2004). ‘Fading 
fathers’ (Dulac, 1995) may enter the divorce with little 
interest in their children or become alienated afterwards 
5 In Australia, parents (mainly mothers) are permittd to receive the 
benefit until their youngest child is 16 years old, although there is 
pressure to seek employment before then. In New Zealand, similar 
pressure occurs when the age is 12 years (although there is no 
longer an official age). In contrast, the Canadian province of Alberta 
expects a ‘welfare mother’ to seek employment when her youngest 
child is 6 months old and all other provinces expect maternal 
employment when the youngest child is from 2 to 6 years old.
6 The terminology differs slightly in each country.
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due to perceived difficulties visiting or maintaining a 
meaningful relationship. Some fathers rekindle interest 
after divorce and become ‘weekend parents’, while others 
attempt to alter existing custody or access arrangements 
(Beck-Gernsheim, 2002).
Fathers are legally required to support their children 
but enforcement procedures used to be lax in the 
three countries (Baker, 2001). If the father failed to 
make court-awarded payments before the 1990s, the 
children’s mother was expected to take him to court, 
which meant she had to prove he was the father, know 
where he lived, take him to court in the jurisdiction 
where he lived and pay the expenses. These procedures 
were too complicated and expensive for most mothers. 
As divorce rates soared and default rates remained 
high, governments were pressured to develop caring 
allowances in the 1970s and to reform child support in 
the 1980s. Before reform, two-thirds to three-quarters 
of fathers failed to pay the full amount of court-awarded 
support within a few years of divorce and many sole-
mother households relied on income support (Funder, 
1996; Baker & Tippin, 1999).
In the late 1980s, Wisconsin and Australia developed 
new procedures that took child support assessment 
out of the courts, based it on a percentage of the non-
resident parent’s income (with a disregard), and collected 
support through the income tax system. New Zealand 
adopted a similar model to Australia (discussed below), 
but Canada could not agree to develop a unified system 
with its divided jurisdiction.7 All the Canadian provinces 
tightened their enforcement procedures but awards are 
still set by judges in court, based on national guidelines. 
Some provinces focus enforcement on ‘welfare families’, 
while others use the ‘first default principle’, meaning 
that the government scheme is activated only when 
unpaid child support is reported. Since 1987, the federal 
government has assisted the provinces with enforcement 
tools, including sharing information to locate and 
intercept defaulters and suspending or denying passports 
(Canadian Department of Justice, 2003). However, 
many custodial parents are forced to take the initiative 
to set enforcement procedures in motion, and variations 
in provincial rules make national enforcement difficult 
when parents move to another province.
New Zealand followed the more efficient Australian 
model and created a child support agency, removed 
assessment from the courts, empowered the taxation 
department to calculate money owed, and paid support 
indirectly through the agency to avoid parental contact 
and conflict. The new schemes in the three countries 
have increased the percentage of children receiving 
support and marginally increased the amounts 
paid and collected, thus saving some public money 
(Baker, 2006). However, the effectiveness of the new 
procedures is disputed and the amount collected varies 
by jurisdiction, as governments use different ways of 
measuring collection (Baker & Tippin, 1999).8 In all 
three countries, the state has been unable to collect 
the full amount due from many non-resident parents, 
especially men who are less affluent, self-employed, 
unemployed, difficult to trace, never married, out of 
contact with their children, or who separated long ago 
(Smyth, 2004).
Since the 1950s governments have been encouraged to 
sign multilateral and bilateral agreements regarding a 
number of policy issues, including the right to live and 
work in other countries (such as between Australia and 
New Zealand) and the enforcement of child custody, 
access and support (Baker, 2006). Recently, the number 
of agreements has increased, as well as the controversies 
surrounding them, as I discuss in the next section.
International agreements on child  
support and custody
International conventions to ensure the enforcement 
of support obligations when parents cross international 
borders date back to 1956, with the United Nations 
Convention on the Recovery Abroad of Maintenance. 
More recent agreements include the 1968 Brussels 
Convention and the 1973 Hague Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Decisions Relating to 
Maintenance Obligations (UK Child Support Agency, 
2003). Governments also sign bilateral agreements 
with individual countries to enforce child support and 
custody arrangements and to apprehend and return 
offenders. For example, agreements have been signed 
between Canada and the United States, Australia and 
7 The provinces assess and enforce child support, and the federal 
government has no constitutional right to establish a national 
system.
8 In Australia, the Child Support Agency claimed a 73% collection rate, 
but this figure was disputed by researchers arguing that partial or late 
payments should be excluded or noted separately, and that parents 
who cannot pay should still be included in the data (Alexander, 1995). 
These rates are also contested in other jurisdictions.
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New Zealand, and Australia and the United States 
(Australian Parliament, 2003).
Before entering these agreements, states must develop 
clear procedures to establish paternity and support 
orders, enforce support, and collect and distribute 
payments. They must also be willing to provide 
administrative and legal assistance to the country seeking 
co-operation without additional cost to that country. 
And finally, a central authority is needed to facilitate 
the implementation of support enforcement, especially 
in countries such as Canada and the United States 
where enforcement is administered by the provincial 
or state governments (US Department of State, 2003). 
An application to retrieve child support from someone 
living in another jurisdiction has to be processed 
according to the laws of that jurisdiction. In other words, 
effective reciprocal agreements require considerable 
co-operation and consistency in laws, procedures and 
practices. In addition, compliance involves additional 
costs for signatory countries in policing, administrative 
work, legal fees and court time, and transport costs when 
they send offenders back home.
The three countries have also signed multilateral 
agreements relating to child custody and access 
disputes. The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects 
of International Child Abduction is the primary 
international treaty dealing with custody, and was 
opened for signatures in 1980 (Crouch, 2003). The 
convention’s provisions are available for citizens if one 
parent from a signatory country moves to another 
signatory country with a child under 16 against the 
objections of the other parent. While the Hague 
Convention is a standard treaty, different jurisdictions 
interpret and implement its clauses in various ways (Jaffe 
et al., 2003, p.111). A discussion of this convention 
illustrates some of the concerns about interpretation, 
implementation and compliance costs.
The primary goal of the Hague Convention is to 
reinstate the status quo, implying that the child’s best 
interests are served by being returned quickly to the 
place of habitual residence. An investigation into either 
parent’s circumstances is discouraged and oral evidence 
by either party is generally disallowed. The convention 
assumes that children’s interests are best protected in 
their home country because their courts will be able to 
carry out a thorough hearing and determine and enforce 
custody and access issues (Kaye, 1999, p.195). However, 
the operation of this convention depends upon the 
goodwill of signatory countries and contains no legally 
binding force to ensure compliance.
The Hague Convention states that exceptions to a child’s 
return are allowed if there is a ‘grave risk’ that the return 
would expose the child to physical or psychological 
harm or otherwise place the child in an ‘intolerable 
situation’ (article 13b, Hague Convention, 1980). This 
is sometimes interpreted to include domestic violence, 
but several researchers argue that the convention offers 
few protections from abusive partners or inhumane 
treatment by officials of the return state, and provides 
no guarantee of fair and impartial hearings in custody 
matters (Kaye, 1999; Jaffe et al., 2003, p.62). In the 
three countries, most decisions under the Hague 
agreement have ordered the child to be returned to the 
home country, denying that there was any ‘grave risk’ 
in doing so (ibid). New Zealand, for example, has dealt 
with at least two cases under the Hague agreement and 
in both cases the court concluded that there was no grave 
risk to the children and ordered them to be returned to 
their home countries.
Child custody and access decisions have increasingly 
reflected awareness of the detrimental impact that 
domestic violence has on children. However, a common 
interpretation of the Hague Convention is that the most 
expeditious way to deal with cases is to send children 
back home. This is viewed as returning the child to the 
care of the country rather than the individual abuser, and 
the country is expected to adequately hear and enforce 
custody issues and to protect the child and parent from 
further domestic violence. However, this assumption 
may not always be justifiable.
Lingering policy concerns
A major concern in the post-divorce family is the 
negative impact of poverty on children, and mother-led 
households are most likely to experience low income. In 
response, all three countries have urged these mothers to 
seek employment and have made recent improvements 
to child care and child benefits (Baker, 2007b). However, 
poverty rates remain high as marital separation increases 
and parents subsequently divide their incomes and 
assets, labour markets become more competitive, and 
fewer jobs are full-time and protected by legislation or 
unions. Of the three countries, poverty rates have been 
the highest in Canada, where nearly half of sole-parent 
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households are poor, but these rates are considerably 
lower in the Nordic countries, suggesting that policy 
reforms can be effective (OECD, 2005, p.57). New 
Zealand has since introduced ‘Working for Families’, 
which should reduce poverty, and Australia and Canada 
have improved child benefits and childcare support, but 
living costs have also increased (Baker, 2007b).
If sole parents are outside the workforce their poverty 
rates rise to 89.7% in Canada, 87.6% in New Zealand 
and 58.7% in Australia, reflecting tighter eligibility rules 
and lower levels of state income support in Canada and 
New Zealand (OECD, 2005, p.57). However, poverty 
rates are influenced by many other factors, including 
income tax policies,9 low wages, and part-time or 
temporary jobs that are often accepted by mothers with 
pre-school children. When sole parents enter paid work 
(part-time or full-time), their household poverty rates 
decline, but over 21% remain poor in New Zealand 
(compared to 28% in Canada and 12% in Australia) 
(ibid). The high Canadian rate reflects low wages and 
the higher gender wage gap in that country (OECD, 
2007, p.73) but parents in all three countries must also 
contend with soaring housing and childcare expenses.
Childcare costs have been especially high in New 
Zealand, where sole parents on average earnings with 
two children at home have been spending 42% of their 
earnings on childcare, compared to 27% in Canada 
and 17% in Australia (OECD, 2007, p.59). However, 
all three countries (or jurisdictions within them) have 
recently reduced specific childcare costs. For example, 
Quebec heavily subsidised childcare to all parents who 
need it, regardless of employment status, for a maximum 
price of $7.00 per day, and New Zealand initiated 
free childcare for 20 hours a week for 3-4 year olds in 
educational care in 2007 (Baker, 2007b). Canada also 
offers a substantial income tax deduction for childcare 
expenses of employed parents. Research has found that 
reducing childcare costs increases maternal employment 
(Roy, 2006).
The second lingering concern is the way that child 
support is calculated. Canadian researchers suggest that 
national child support guidelines are inequitable because 
they consider the non-resident parent’s income but not 
his net assets or expenses. They also fail to adequately 
acknowledge the resident parent’s income and assets, 
or the children’s financial needs (Wu & Schimmele, 
2005). The same could be said for Australia and New 
Zealand. Furthermore, self-employed parents do 
not always declare their full income to governments. 
Increasingly, separated parents find new partners and 
produce or acquire additional children to support. In 
some jurisdictions, support priority is given to children 
living in the household, while others give priority to 
children from previous relationships (Baker & Tippin, 
1999). Debates also continue about how to consider 
hidden expenses, gifts and the costs of shared parenting, 
especially when the child lives in the household for less 
than half the time. Finally, the minimum child support 
payment required by government remains low in many 
places, such as $10 per week in New Zealand, which 
clearly does not cover many childrearing costs.
The third issue concerns the numerous cases that remain 
‘in default’, meaning that the parent failed to pay the 
total amount, the payment arrived late or the payment 
was not made. One Canadian study in New Brunswick 
(Lapointe & Richardson, 1994) found that only 58% of 
cases involved full compliance after reform, with 10% 
of parents explicitly refusing to pay. The rest involved 
temporary non-payment or disputes about the amount, 
but failure to pay is clearly associated with perceived access 
difficulties. Fathers often blame the children’s mother for 
denying or complicating access, while mothers complain 
about paternal irregularities in access visits or inadequate 
care (Amato, 2004; Smyth, 2004).
Fathers also change their minds after legal custody 
and access arrangements are confirmed in court. The 
Australian Institute of Family Studies found that 41% 
of non-resident fathers wanted to alter the children’s 
living arrangements five years after separation: two-
thirds wanted the children to live with them and the 
rest wanted equal care (Smyth, Sheehan & Fehlberg, 
2001). Parents also disagree about the amount of 
contact fathers actually have, with non-resident fathers 
reporting more child contact than resident mothers 
confirm. In addition, some fathers argue that support 
payments should be reduced to compensate for shared 
care. Although many people believe that child support 
legislation ought to foster and facilitate parent-child 
contact, legislators have argued that linking father-child 
contact with child support is not in the best interests of 
the child (Smyth, 2004).
9 Both Canada and Australia have substantial personal tax deductions 
that are beneficial to low-income households.
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More women than men initiate separation10 but sole 
parenthood is usually a transitional stage for both (Baker 
& Tippin, 1999). However, about three-quarters of men 
and two-thirds of women re-partner within five years, 
and men re-partner faster. In addition, remarriage rates 
are declining with more cohabitation, but cohabitation 
leads to higher separation rates than legal marriage 
(Baker, 2006). Nevertheless, re-partnering rates reflect 
both choices and constraints. For example, beneficiary 
mothers lose their income support if they cohabit with 
or marry an employed man, and men do not always 
consider ‘welfare mothers’ as desirable partners. Negative 
marital experiences further discourage former partners 
from remarriage. In addition, men tend to marry 
women younger than themselves, especially in second or 
subsequent marriages, and fewer older men are available 
in the population (Baker, 2007a).
A fourth concern relates to cases of child ‘abduction’, 
which receive considerable media attention. ‘Child 
abductors’ are often portrayed as non-resident fathers 
trying to obtain custody, but most Hague Convention 
cases involve mothers who are primary caregivers taking 
their children back to the mother’s home country, with 
an increasing number reporting that they are fleeing 
from abusive partners (Coester-Waltjen, 2000). Some 
researchers have argued that the Hague Convention 
allows little room for mothers’ fear of violence if they are 
expected to return to the country where their children 
normally live (Kaye, 1999, pp.197-8). A common 
judicial response to allegations of domestic violence 
is to issue the remiss parent with ‘undertakings’, such 
as attending a stopping violence programme and/or 
abiding by protection orders. Yet these cannot be legally 
enforced in the countries concerned (Coster-Waltjen, 
2000, p.68).
As more parents travel internationally, live with partners 
from other countries and receive dual citizenship, 
the state needs to ensure that non-resident parents 
are guaranteed access to their child unless there is a 
valid reason to restrict access. However, access cannot 
compromise the safety and well-being of the resident 
parent or child, and existing laws about crossing borders 
with unmet family obligations need to be enforced.
Conclusion
New Zealand, Australia and Canada have experienced 
similar increases in marriage breakdown, migration 
and family poverty. In all three countries, governments 
have developed gender-neutral laws and programmes 
relating to divorce, child support and custody. In 
deciding where the post-separation child should live, 
they all emphasise the best interests of the child and 
encourage parental co-operation over access and care 
arrangements. Although most separating parents 
manage these issues without much formal assistance, all 
three governments have attempted to ensure that family 
courts include mediation and less adversarial practices 
(Baker, 2006). Yet debates continue about how to deal 
with complicated parenting arrangements and lingering 
disputes between former partners.
The post-separation processes set out in laws and policies 
in the three countries have been unable to compensate 
for the gendered nature of paid and unpaid work, 
which creates economic inequalities between partners 
that continue after separation. Many mothers work 
part time in order to retain caring responsibilities, 
especially in Australia and New Zealand, but in doing 
so these mothers reduce their household earnings. When 
marriages end, mothers with young children often need 
a transitional period of income support but it seldom 
pays above the minimum wage. Most children continue 
to live with their separated mother even though the 
laws are gender-neutral. Mother-led households tend 
to experience an income drop even when these mothers 
work for pay, as families increasingly need two incomes 
and male earnings still tend to be higher than female 
earnings. Many fathers still fail to pay the required 
amount of child support on time, and some lose contact 
with children from previous relationships. Few non-
resident parents can earn enough to support children 
in more than one household, especially in today’s less 
regulated labour market.
More international travel has encouraged governments 
to sign international agreements to enforce parental 
obligations, but these agreements require co-operation 
between jurisdictions, a convergence in enforcement 
procedures and heavy reliance on national enforcement. 
International pressure to restructure family policies 
increases when markets become international and 
investors and employers promote neo-liberal labour 
practices. At the same time, interest groups press for 
10 But they often blame their male partner for prior adultery, abuse, 
lack of consideration and/or unequal division of labour at home.
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new entitlements, often making contradictory demands 
that complicate the reform process.
Caring for children constrains employment opportunities 
unless incomes are high enough to purchase care, 
but childcare continues to be expensive in many 
jurisdictions and is not always available when needed for 
employment. Most politicians publicly say that children 
should not have to live in poverty, but few states have 
successfully bridged the poverty gap between two-parent 
and one-parent households. These concerns linger in the 
liberal states but have been less problematic in the social 
democratic states, where children’s well-being is viewed 
more as a public responsibility. In contrast, the liberal 
states have devoted fewer resources to family income 
support, universal children’s services and family-related 
employment benefits (Jenson & Sineau, 2001; Hantrais, 
2004; Baker, 2006).
This discussion reveals some of the complexity of current 
concerns about post-divorce families. New Zealand has 
developed relatively effective procedures to deal with 
child custody and support, especially compared to some 
Canadian provinces, but it is worth reiterating some 
findings from the research:
•	 Child	 support	 enforcement	mechanisms	must	
be automatic rather than dependent on parental 
complaints about non-payment.
•	 The	income,	assets	and	major	gifts	from	both	parents	
need to be considered in assessing child support.
•	 Minimum	 levels	 of	 parental	 support	 and	 caring	
allowances need to be high enough to keep children 
out of poverty.
•	 Existing	 laws	 that	 prohibit	 parents	 owing	 child	
support from leaving the country need to be 
enforced.
•	 Witnessing	parental	violence	and	a	genuine	fear	of	
partner violence require more careful consideration 
in custody cases.
•	 Childcare	services	need	to	be	affordable	and	accessible	
to enable parents to become self-supporting.
•	 Policy	makers	 need	 to	 acknowledge	 that	mothers	
and fathers seldom have comparable earnings, they 
typically perform different amounts of caring work, 
and often have different perspectives on the post-
divorce family.
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